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Going East
Tense calm prevailed in Lebanon’s streets yesterday. Just the previous day, it seemed like civil war, always a menacing possibility in this ethnically divided country, would break out any second. Sunni protesters had taken to the streets in a “day of wrath” against the apparent takeover by the pro-Iranian Hezbollah – the militia of the Shiite underdogs that has evolved to become the godfather and puppet master of the new government.
Just a couple of weeks ago, the pro-Western coalition of the March 14, an amalgam of Sunni, Christian and Druze parties, had enjoyed a parliamentary majority and dominated a national unity government in which Hezbollah took part. Sunni Prime Minister Saad Hariri seemed poised to stare down Hezbollah’s block of March 8 in a political standoff revolving around the investigation of one of the most spectacular political assassinations in modern history - a car bomb that killed Saad Hariri’s father Rafiq and more than 20 other people in February 2005. Crisis erupted when it became clear that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), the UN body formed to probe the murder, was about to file indictments against members of Hezbollah. Hezbollah, fearing that its image as the defender of the Arab nation would be tarnished irreparably, demanded of Hariri to divest from the STL and revoke its findings even before they were published. The demand went one step too far. Gambling on his parliamentary majority and defending his slain father’s honor, Hariri felt compelled to withstand Hezbollah’s threats. But the challenge backfired: The Shiites left the government, to return not as a minor coalition partner, but as Lebanon’s most important power broker. Hariri, and his Western allies, may well remain delegated to the sidelines henceforth.
Hezbollah’s “constitutional coup”, as members of the March 14 coalition called it, was achieved with its trademark mixture of ingenuity and intimidation. While both camps scrambled to gain the necessary parliamentary majority for their favored candidate, it staged a dry run for a military takeover of the country. In the dark of night, members of the Shiite militia, the only armed force in Lebanon beside the army, took up positions all over Beirut. Unarmed, but clad in black uniforms and equipped with walkie-talkies and menacing looks, they sent a clear signal: Hezbollah would resort to blank force if need be, just like two years ago, when its troops captured the capital within hours and killed more than 80 people.
The maneuver was only one part of a grand strategy. While Hariri was busy declaring that he would never pair up with Hezbollah, its leader Hassan Nasrallah was busy prying one of Hariri’s most important allies out of his coalition. The Druze leader Walid Jumblatt is a known turncoat: Once a devoted supporter of Syria, he sensed Syria’s weakness in the aftermath of the Hariri assassination and began calling its president a “half ape”. This week, Jumblatt came full circle and returned to Hezbollah’s warm embrace. The move was not based on sympathy alone: According to Arab media reports, he warned his followers that siding with Hariri could have “catastrophic consequences” for the security of the Druse population in Hezbullah-controlled areas. Jumblatt is a wily tactician who knows the perils of Lebanon’s byzantine politics firsthand: His father was also killed, presumably by Syrian agents, in 1977. Now he has a penchant for sticking with the side with the real power. The same report claimed that Jumblatt anticipated a “harsh battle” in which “Hariri's international backers only resort to statements, while his opponents (Hezbullah) turn to all forms of military and popular pressure.” Giving his about-face the veneer of inner conviction, Jumblatt renamed his party from “Democratic Gathering” to “the National Struggle Front”, a title more in keeping with Hezbollah’s belligerent language.
Once Jumblatt was pocketed, Nasrallah set out to find a suitable candidate for the post of Prime Minister, who, according to Lebanon’s constitution that divides the nation’s spoils between ethnic groups, has to be a Sunni Muslim. He found the country’s richest man, a 55 year old Harvard graduate called Najib Miqati, who heads his own parliamentary faction of two seats. Sunnis felt hoodwinked twice: Not only have they been outmaneuvered by Nasrallah, but also betrayed by one of their own. Miqati may have US$ 2,5 billion at his command, but the hearts of the Sunnis almost universally beat for Hariri. They took to the streets to vent their anger.
A victorious Nasrallah could afford to sound conciliatory: “We do not seek power”, he said on a televised address after Sunni street demonstrations began to abate. “The next Prime minister will not be Hezbollah’s, nor will the next cabinet be. This is being propagated only to mobilize foreign powers against Lebanon, especially the US, Israel and those involved in the Israeli-American project in the region”, Nasrallah assumed. Miqati was eager to appear as a consensus candidate, calling Hariri to join his government alongside Hezbollah. Hariri categorically declined the offer, for the time being.
Two large questions now emerge: What will be the fate of the STL, whose investigation is backed by Hariri and the West precisely because its findings are bound to weaken Hezbollah and its patron, Iran? And second, how will Hezbollah and the Lebanese army comport themselves? The US has already voiced its concerns, threatening to revoke its military aid, US$ 720 million since 2006, should Hezbollah take the reins in Beirut. Its southern neighbor Israel has uttered a stern warning: while once Hezbollah attacks elicited only limited responses, any violation of Israel’s sovereignty is now bound to lead to total war between the two countries.
Nasrallah made clear that Hezbollah’s arms are aimed not at his political enemies but only Israel: “We never asked for a ministerial portfolio, administration, or government. Everything we ask for is for you to understand that we are a resistance movement”, he said. In a clear reference to the upcoming indictments he continued: “We did our best to defend the country, preserve Lebanese and Arab dignity, and liberate lands and sanctities. We want two things from you: Leave us alone, don’t plot against us or backstab us. We open our chest for Israel bullets; this how we want to be martyred. We don’t want to take your bullets in our backs.”
Hariri continues to cry foul. Well aware that he is militarily inferior to Hezbollah’s might, Hariri asked his followers to abstain from violence. His camp appealed to the President in an open letter: “Lebanon is in danger,” it read, warning of a “coup” planned by Hezbollah against the Lebanese state. Outgunned and outwitted, March 14 asked President Michel Sleiman to turn to “the Arab League and the U.N. Security Council to defend Lebanon against the regional plan to make the country a rogue state. Hezbollah has started its rebellion against the state.” Regarding the fact that Hezbollah has already succeeded to place its candidate in the Prime Minister’s palace, the letter’s defiant ending seemed hopelessly anachronistic: “We won’t let the militia [Hezbollah] and its 40,000 rockets put its hand on the state.” They actually already have.
© 2010 Gil Yaron - Making the Middle East Understandable |